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Phenomenologists have always been concerned with the problem of prejudice. However, to
appreciate  this  problem,  we  need  to  understand  how  the  phenomenological  notion  of
prejudice differs from our everyday use of the term. Hans-Georg Gadamer defines prejudices
as pre-judgments, presuppositions that shape our experience. As he puts it, “Prejudices are
biases of our openness to  the world.  They are simply conditions  whereby we experience
something – whereby what we encounter says something to us” (Gadamer 2008, 9). When we
characterize  prejudices  in  this  way—as  “simply  conditions  whereby  we  experience
something”—they seem benign. But once we understand that every experience is biased or
prejudiced in some way, we realize that we may experience things not as they are, but as we
already  believe  them  to  be.  To  achieve  a  genuine  understanding  of  perception,  or
embodiment,  or  even  human  existence  as  such,  we  need  to  critically  evaluate  our  own
prejudices  in  order  to  think  outside  the  conceptual  frameworks  that  shape  our  present
understanding (Fernandez 2017).
In light of phenomenology’s longstanding concern with prejudice, it should come as
no surprise that this same concern is found across many branches of applied phenomenology,
including the interdisciplinary field of phenomenological psychopathology. In his founding
article, “The Phenomenological Approach in Psychopathology,” Karl Jaspers says, 
When we were children, we first drew things as we imagined them, not as we saw
them; so as psychologists and psychopathologists we go through a stage where we
form our own ideas, in one way or another, of psychic events, and only later acquire
an  unprejudiced  direct  grasp  of  these  events  as  they  really  are.  And  so  this
phenomenological attitude is to be acquired only by ever-repeated effort and by the
ever renewed overcoming of prejudice. (Jaspers 1968, 1316)
We  all  have  an  idea  of  what  we  mean  when  we  use  concepts  like  ‘depressed  mood,’
‘attention deficit,’ ‘delusion,’ or ‘hallucination’. But, if pressed, would we be able to describe
any of these phenomena in detail? Do we really understand what it’s like to find oneself in
the midst  of a delusion or enveloped in a depressed mood? And, if  not,  can we claim a
genuine understanding of these concepts?
This  is  precisely the challenge  that  phenomenological  psychopathologists  take on:
The best work in this field takes up a phenomenon that we think we’re familiar with, reveals
the  confusions  that  cloud  our  current  understanding,  and  provides  a  more  nuanced
characterization based on analyses of first-person reports. If we assume that we already know
what we mean when we use concepts like ‘delusion’ or ‘depressed mood’, then we’ll fail to
make  any  progress  toward  a  genuine  understanding  of  these  conditions.  The
phenomenological attitude that Jaspers refers to is, first and foremost, a critical orientation
toward the everyday, scientific, and even philosophical prejudices that so easily convince us
that  we  know more  than  we do.  Phenomenology  is  as  much  about  unlearning  what  we
thought we knew as it is about the generation of new knowledge. These new characterizations
produced by phenomenological psychopathologists are still subject to revision and refinement
in light of new evidence and novel interpretations of existing data. But, by unmooring us
from our existing prejudices and assumptions, they have the potential to provide new insights
into the experiences they investigate.
How  widely  has  this  critical  orientation  been  applied  within  the  field  of
phenomenological psychopathology? Within this field, the phenomenological attitude is most
commonly used to critically reflect upon our assumptions about specific signs and symptoms.
But phenomenologists have also questioned the legitimacy of current diagnostic categories
(Ratcliffe 2015), challenged the naturalistic assumptions of contemporary psychiatry (Fuchs
2017),  criticized  the  check-list  diagnostic  methods  of  the  DSM’s  operational  approach
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(Parnas and Bovet 2015), and proposed alternative approaches to psychiatric research and
classification (Fernandez 2019; Nelson, McGorry, and Fernandez Forthcoming).
However,  there’s  another  prejudice—deeply  rooted  in  psychiatry—to  which
phenomenologists have paid remarkably little attention (although R. D. Laing is a notable
exception).  We  might  call  this  the  prejudice  of  pathology  or,  perhaps,  the  prejudice  of
disorder. The very word—“psychopathology”—refers to the study of the suffering psyche.
And this characterization is borne out in the majority of classical and contemporary work in
phenomenological  psychopathology,  which  doesn’t  shy  away  from  characterizing  the
conditions  it  studies as forms of suffering,  distress, or,  simply,  illness.  On the one hand,
because psychopathology is a subfield of psychiatry, these characterizations should come as
no surprise. On the other hand, one may reasonably hope that phenomenologists take a more
critical, questioning stance toward these characterizations.
But this isn’t a stance that we need to devise all on our own. Proponents of a variety
of  political  currents—most  notably  the  neurodiversity  movement  and  the  mad  pride
movement—have done the difficult work of criticizing, questioning, and unlearning what so
many of us presume without a second thought. Of course, not all of their concerns will be of
immediately  interest  to  phenomenologists.  But  many  of  their  questions  are,  at  root,
philosophical.  And  some  of  these  have  immediate  methodological  implications.  As
phenomenologists,  we  ought  to  be  concerned  if  our  prejudices  lead  us  astray  of  the
phenomena that we hope to understand. If these movements help us identify, articulate, and
suspend these prejudices, that we ought to embrace them.  
One might object to this proposal by arguing that these movements, being first and
foremost  political,  do  not  provide  well-formulated  philosophical  theories  or
conceptualizations.  But  this  is  hardly  the  case.  Philosophers  have  recently  examined  the
discourse of both the neurodiversity movement and the mad pride movement, extracting and
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articulating  their  philosophical  and  theoretical  positions  (Chapman  2019b;  2020;  Rashed
2019). Moreover, movements such as disability pride have already shaped the philosophy of
disability (Barnes 2016), and we’re beginning to see similar influences in the philosophy of
neurodiversity (Chapman 2019a). Drawing on the positions outlined in these works, there are
two key directions that should be of immediate interest to phenomenologists: First, they push
us to conceptualize conditions, or ways of being, in terms of diversity or difference, rather
than disorder.  Second,  they stress how diagnostic  labels  are,  in  many cases,  taken up as
identities.  The first  direction should motivate  phenomenologists  to ask questions such as,
“How does  the  presumption  of  suffering  shape  how we  interpret  first-person  reports  of
experience?” and “Have we neglected important aspects of conditions because we’ve already
conceptualized them as inherently negative or undesirable?” The second direction, on the role
of identity, should motivate phenomenologists to ask questions such as, “What does it mean
to take autism or schizophrenia not as a diagnosis, but as a social identity?” and “How does
the shift from an illness narrative to an identity narrative modify experiences of self, others,
and environment?”
As Jaspers  reminds  us,  the  task  of  overcoming prejudice  requires  ongoing effort.
Prejudices  are  often so ingrained in  our  ways of  thinking and experiencing  that  they go
entirely unnoticed. If we are genuinely committed to identifying, assessing, and suspending
our prejudices, then we ought to listen to those most affected by them. Their critical analyses
may allow us to see things in a way that we haven’t seen them before. And it’s precisely this
new  way  of  seeing  that  may  lead  to  conceptual  and  theoretical  breakthroughs  in
understanding.
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